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[Excerpt] This report examines one specific subset of New York state’s contingent workforce: on-demand 
workers who obtain work through online platforms or “apps.” Often referred to popularly as “gig” workers, 
we use the phrase “on-demand platform workers” in an attempt to clarify the workers to whom we refer. 
Our research shows that on-demand platform workers: 
• Are notoriously difficult to count, due to factors such as the part-time quality of their work, 
high turnover rates and confusion over the definition of terms; 
• Experience low and unstable earnings and a lack of benefits, requiring reliance on second 
or third jobs, other family members’ incomes, and various types of public aid; 
• Experience a range of dangerous health and safety hazards on the job, most of which are 
uncompensated; 
• Suffer from evaluations based primarily on consumer ratings of workers’ performance, 
with no recourse for workers to appeal disciplinary actions; and 
• Are negatively impacted by automated matching between workers and consumers and 
other communication asymmetries. 
Forms of control vary across different platforms, but in general platforms transfer or externalize risks 
onto workers, with those that use strict automated control systems (known as algorithmic management) 
maximizing their control over the labor process. 
On-demand platform work, like other forms of contingent and temporary employment, destabilizes 
industries, undermines worker protections and living standards, and significantly contributes to wealth 
and income inequality. 
Correct classification of workers is a core issue for labor standards in the “on-demand” economy, in part 
because the impact of worker misclassification on New York state funds and tax revenues is severe. 
New York’s regulatory structure does not now provide the necessary level of oversight to curb abuse in 
the on-demand economy and protect worker, business, and taxpayer interests. 
Policymakers in New York state now have the opportunity to lead the way by making sure that on-demand 
platform workers will enjoy the same status and protections as all other workers in the state. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
ON-DEMAND PLATFORM WORKERS
This report examines one specific subset of New York state’s contingent workforce: on -demand 
workers who obtain work through online platforms or “apps.” Often referred to popularly as 
“gig” workers, we use the phrase “on-demand platform workers” in an attempt to clarify the 
workers to whom we refer.
Our research shows that on-demand platform workers:
• Are notoriously difficult to count, due to factors such as the part-time quality of their 
work, high turnover rates and confusion over the definition of terms; 
• Experience low and unstable earnings and a lack of benefits, requiring reliance on 
second or third jobs, other family members’ incomes, and various types of public aid; 
• Experience a range of dangerous health and safety hazards on the job, most of 
which are uncompensated; 
• Suffer from evaluations based primarily on consumer ratings of workers’ performance, 
with no recourse for workers to appeal disciplinary actions; and 
• Are negatively impacted by automated matching between workers and consumers 
and other communication asymmetries. 
Forms of control vary across different platforms, but in general platforms transfer or externalize 
risks onto workers, with those that use strict automated control systems (known as algorithmic 
management) maximizing their control over the labor process. 
On-demand platform work, like other forms of contingent and temporary employment, 
destabilizes industries, undermines worker protections and living standards, and significantly 
contributes to wealth and income inequality.  
Correct classification of workers is a core issue for labor standards in the “on-demand” 
economy, in part because the impact of worker misclassification on New York state funds and 
tax revenues is severe.
New York’s regulatory structure does not now provide the necessary level of oversight to curb 
abuse in the on-demand economy and protect worker, business, and taxpayer interests. 
Policymakers in New York state now have the opportunity to lead the way by making sure that 
on-demand platform workers will enjoy the same status and protections as all other workers in 
the state. 
ON-DEMAND PLATFORM WORKERS IN NEW YORK STATE 4
Around 2010, the so-called “gig” economy was billed as the future of work, a future where 
people could schedule work around their other life obligations and live free from the monotonous 
9-to-5 grind. Trading on the goodwill generated by the “sharing economy,” online platforms like 
Amazon Mechanical Turk began to offer short-term work assignments to anyone with an Internet 
connection. The future of work was here, and you did not even need to leave your home to get 
to the office.
Reality has been much different. Transportation Network Company drivers sleeping in their cars.1 
Domestic workers forced to stand in the cold while they wait for a client.2 Workers fear losing 
their jobs without warning and without the ability to contest their firing.3 Discrimination against both 
customers and workers.4 A pending retirement saving crisis.5 Sexual harassment against workers 
who fear receiving a “low rating.”6 The past few years have shown the techno-optimism of the 
early 2000s was largely unwarranted; the same problems found in the wider economy were not 
wiped away by a shiny new finish, but the structure of on-demand platforms has left regulators 
struggling to find ways of addressing these harms.7
What makes regulating platforms so difficult? Why did the on-demand platform economy expand 
so rapidly? Before discussing the legal foundations of the on-demand platform economy and 
how other countries have incorporated these companies into the larger employment architecture, 
it is important to define the key concepts which ask some big questions of the so-called “gig” 
economy.
INTRODUCTION
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WHAT IS “ON-DEMAND” LABOR?
The popular press is filled with different terms describing digitally intermediated labor exchanges. 
At first, these companies were “sharing companies,” with a set of transportation companies even 
donning the term “ridesharing.”8 Lyft, early on, cast itself as “your friend with a car” while Fiverr 
framed itself as a platform for people who had a few extra minutes to earn extra cash.
There is no universally accepted definition of “gig” work or what constitutes a “gig” company. 
One of the main reasons for this is that companies structure their relationship with workers in 
vastly different ways.9 This is possible because the underlying technology, essentially algorithmic 
search tools, is very flexible. For example, some companies let users search almost all possible 
workers for their job (e.g., Upwork), while other services automatically match a client and worker 
together (e.g., Uber). Some services offer a wide-range of services (e.g., Amazon Mechanical 
Turk), while others offer only a specific type of laborer (e.g., Wag, a dog walking company). 
Further complicating matters, some “gig” companies allow people to rent capital goods (e.g., 
rooms in their homes, Airbnb), while others focus on labor exchanges (e.g., TaskRabbit).10
All of these services rely on the same basic production system - an algorithm that arranges 
search results - but deploys them differently based on slightly different business models. They all 
make it easier for people to find the things they want,11 yet the wide range of ways on-demand 
platform companies establish their platforms can result in people talking past one another, with 
one party thinking about the way company X operates while another focuses on the practices of 
company Y.
To prevent this confusion, this report offers the following description of “on-demand platform” 
labor that will be used throughout the report: On-demand platform labor refers to workers who 
use an online intermediary to accept work opportunities that are offered on a job-by-job basis.
The hallmark of these jobs is that they are usually of a short duration, sometimes no more 
than 5-10 minutes, and purchased through an online service. At the extreme is an Amazon 
Mechanical Turk worker, who accepts jobs for short periods of time and is provided no 
employment protections from either Amazon or the buyer. The definition described here is 
intended to avoid questions like those raised by SwapTree, a service that allows people to 
exchange capital goods.12 Instead, this report will mainly focus on the experience of workers who 
gain temporary employment through a digital intermediary: on-demand platform workers. Uber 
is one of the oldest, largest and best known of the on-demand platform companies. Because 
of this, there is much more information available about Uber’s workers and policies. If we often 
refer to Uber in what follows, that is simply because it is so ubiquitous in popular discourse and 
because many newer companies are adopting similar business models.
Algorithmic management has created a new means 
for employers to operate, requiring us to reevaluate 
how technology has shifted the relationship between 
workers and firms.
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HOW LARGE IS THE “ON-DEMAND PLATFORM” ECONOMY?
Without an established measure of “gig company,” it should be no surprise that there is also 
no consensus regarding the number of people who engage in on-demand platform work.13 
Depending on how you define an on-demand platform worker, the estimates range from one 
in three people14 to less than one percent15 of the American workforce. While some have 
used the varying estimates to dismiss the importance of the “gig” economy,16 it is necessary 
to note that these varying estimates suggest two different, but related, stories. The largest 
estimates of “gig” economy use a vast definition of “independent work” - essentially, anyone 
who has worked any job outside their traditional job is included in this estimate. Under this 
view of “gig” work, if you work even one hour outside of your main job you are counted as 
an “independent” worker. The growing number of people who need to seek employment 
outside of their “normal” job points to backsliding in the quality of “normal” employment and 
the unwinding of the social contract at work.17 
At the other end of the spectrum, the lower estimates reported by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics help to quantify the number of people who use digital platforms at any one moment. 
As independent contractors, on-demand platform workers are not afforded any protection from 
discipline and discharge, creating a permanent sense of insecurity within this category of work. 
Workers can log into their platform one day and be disconnected the next without explanation. 
Viewed in the light of unpredictable pay and combined with no workplace protections or 
benefits, it is not surprising that many reports indicate that on-demand platforms have very 
high turnover rates, with estimates ranging from 50 to 100% annually.18
The two estimates of size above, ranging from 33% to <1%, look at a single moment in time. 
PEW Research conducted a nationally representative survey to examine how many people 
engaged in online “gig” type work in the previous year. This study found that roughly 8% 
of all US adults had earned income using an online platform over the course of a year.19 
Additionally, the JP Morgan Chase Institute found that half of all “gig” workers exited the 
industry within six months, consistent with other estimates of turnover in this type of work.20 
These studies combine to indicate that, while at any single moment in time on-demand 
platform work may represent a small portion of the economy, due to failing social safety nets 
and unpredictable work schedules, many people will move in and out of these jobs over 
time. Also, there is reason to believe that these numbers underrepresented the total number 
of on-demand platform workers. Ticona, Mateescu and Rosenblat document that the platform 
economy consists of a large number of people who face social barriers in the labor market, 
such as undocumented workers.21 These populations are difficult to survey accurately, as we 
discuss below, meaning that existing projections most likely understate the number of people 
who engage in this type of work.
The problem of expanding digital labor markets will only become worse in the coming years.22 
Kaushik Basu, Chief Economist and Senior Vice President of the World Bank and the C. Marks 
Professor of Economics at Cornell University, predicts that widening the digital labor market 
will result in increased inequality, political contestation, and conflict.23 These platforms do not 
only target the service industry - some emerging platforms offer financial analysis or speech 
writing, and can even replace entire corporate research departments (iCEO).24
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WHAT ARE “PLATFORMS”?
Platforms are companies that offer people work through an online website or application. In many 
ways, they are like temporary hiring agencies that match businesses looking for short-term hires 
with workers. For Uber and Lyft, these apps match people looking for a ride with people working 
as short-term taxi drivers. For almost a decade, this simple description was the way companies 
described themselves: merely matchmakers that link two people together.
We know that is not the full story. Many platforms operate performance review systems, control the 
exchange of money, dock worker’s pay for poor performance, discipline or fire (de-activate) workers, 
and some even train workers and specify how work must be done. On-demand platform companies, 
just like any other employer, create the “work rules” that labor must follow when working on their 
platform. As one expert in employment law and technology argues, focusing on the technology can 
make it harder to see the human labor that is subject to these policies and procedures.25 
In this light, it is important to note that Uber’s work model has some of the most restrictive work rules 
of any on-demand platform company. For example, Uber sets workers’ wages, can cut wages at any 
time, creates a performance evaluation system, does not allow workers to dispute their “performance 
evaluation,” can discipline and discharge workers for any reason, and unilaterally allocates work 
across the labor force.26 Yet perhaps the most restrictive element of Uber’s work system is that 
it forces drivers to accept an undefined percentage of jobs they are offered yet does not inform 
workers of a customer’s destination prior to picking up the passenger. Due to this combination, 
drivers can lose money on a job because the cost of picking up the passenger is larger than the 
minimum fare but are never aware 
how close they are to being put in 
a “timeout” or deactivated from the 
service. 
Pulling back the “algorithmic curtain” 
reveals that these are the same 
decisions that everyday employers 
must make about their workforce.27 
Yet it also shows that the on- 
demand platform economy is not 
monolithic; companies build their 
algorithms in a variety of different 
ways. Let us examine the ride hail 
industry. Even though Uber is the 
most well known ride hail company, 
other companies exert less control 
than Uber does. Some notify drivers 
regarding how much they will make 
on a job prior to their accepting 
it (GetMe), others allow for pre-
scheduling rides (Wingz), and some 
platforms let drivers build their own 
clientele (Fare). (See Appendix B for 
information about the range of on-
demand platform companies.)
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WHAT ARE THE COSTS OF AN UNREGULATED ON-DEMAND PLATFORM 
ECONOMY?
The costs of an unregulated on-demand platform economy are now well documented: 
discrimination against workers and customers, poor working conditions, low wages, and 
offloading costs onto cities and communities.28 These are the same costs that led the state and 
federal governments to pass sweeping labor regulations in the 1930s and 1940s to protect 
workers against the worst abuses of mass production and industrialization.
While it is a cliché to say we are living through the “second industrial revolution,” it is a useful 
reminder that society responded to the industrial revolution with strong, progressive labor laws. 
Just as it was then, the excesses of progress must be tempered with public policy to ensure that 
companies do not offload economic risk onto workers and society.
Racial and GendeR discRimination in the on-demand PlatfoRm economy 
Existing antidiscrimination laws were written with the image of big companies in mind. 
How should these laws be updated to handle on-demand platforms? For example, when an 
Uber driver declines to accept a ride from a passenger of color, is the application liable for 
that driver’s behavior? Or when a merchant on Airbnb does not rent their home out to African-
Americans, who should be held liable?
There is growing evidence these are not merely hypothetical concerns. One academic study 
found that Uber and Lyft drivers discriminate based on both the gender and race of customers.29 
Another found that Airbnb hosts were 16% less likely to rent their home out to an African 
American client.30 A third study found that Airbnb hosts routinely do not provide accommodations 
for clients with disabilities despite Airbnb’s requirements that hosts do so.31 
Airbnb also plays an important role in changing local labor and housing markets. Allowed to 
act as short-term rental units, an expansion of Airbnb may push rents up and push workers out 
of cities.32 One study estimates that Airbnb has increased the median long-term rental price in 
Manhattan by between $380 and $700.33 As Airbnb expands and changes the dynamics of local 
housing markets, finding methods of fitting it into existing public regulatory infrastructure will be 
essential to ensuring that workers have a home in their communities.
PooR WoRkinG conditions 
Workers in the on-demand platform economy who are reliant on client ratings are put in a 
vulnerable position where, for any reason, clients can give them a poor evaluation that directly 
affects their earnings and future work opportunities. For some workers, a single negative review 
can result in them becoming “unhirable.” As one team of researchers found, workers are placed 
in a situation where they must choose to ignore harassment to maintain high ratings, or confront 
a customer but risk losing future work (or face deactivation on the platform). Additionally, when 
on-demand platform workers turn down jobs, they risk retaliation from clients in the form of 
complaints and poor ratings. On many platforms, workers cannot leave public reviews about 
clients’ behavior, meaning that other platform workers may be subject to the same poor treatment 
from clients.34
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This power imbalance manifests on almost all platforms where workers are subject to a “rating 
system.” Uber drivers report they “fear the ratings,” and lack meaningful voice in appealing 
termination or disciplinary decisions. The same dynamic is present on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 
where clients can turn down a worker’s labor for any reason but still keep the work product. By 
writing the rules of their platform to favor clients over workers, platforms have become active 
participants in creating poor working conditions in the on-demand platform economy.
 
offloadinG Risk onto communities 
 
Without the ability to earn a living wage on these platforms, many on-demand workers turn to 
public assistance programs to help fill that gap. As noted in a report by the UCLA Labor Research 
Center, one-in-five Uber drivers is enrolled in public assistance programs to help make ends 
meet.35 Not surprisingly, these workers are reported to be one major car or medical expense 
away from bankruptcy. By extension, reports suggest this is creating a retirement crisis where on-
demand platform workers cannot save for retirement, further compounding the challenges to this 
economic cohort.36
On-demand platforms have gotten ahead of regulators, allowing other costs to be passed onto 
communities as they grow. For example, regulation of traditional car services and taxi cab numbers 
through medallions has been skirted by transportation network companies. Bruce Schaller has 
found that the rise of “gig” transportation platforms has resulted in significant traffic congestion 
in large cities.37 With so many drivers on the roads, many workers are left to cruise without 
passengers, resulting in low wages and higher driver expenses.38 Research also suggests this is 
associated with slowdowns during rush hour and increased stress on public infrastructure.39 
Since ride hailing companies can use venture capital money to run a yearly loss, they are able to 
bankrupt existing transportation options.40 For example, the value of taxi medallions has collapsed 
in many cities in the United States, bankrupting some taxi drivers and companies.41 Yet it is not just 
taxi companies that are struggling to keep up with companies that can lose billions of dollars a 
year; public transit systems also are having to cut back service because of lower ridership.42
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lack of WoRkeR Voice 
While most on-demand platform workers find themselves without the ability to contest discipline 
or discharge through an internal dispute resolution system, virtually none can seek remedy 
through the court system. Since these workers are considered “independent contractors,” they 
are unable to organize and bargain for greater voice in their work.43 Furthermore, Charlotte 
Garden documents that individual arbitration agreements are “ubiquitous” on platforms, 
depriving workers of the ability to pursue their claims in court.44 Research by ILR’s Alexander 
Colvin on individual arbitration agreements has found these forums are not mere substitutes for 
litigation. Without the ability to either form unions or use the public court system, workers are 
trapped into private justice forums that structurally favor employers over workers.45 
The research carried out for this report, described below, found similar experiences voiced by 
on-demand platform workers in New York state.
WHERE DID THE ON-DEMAND PLATFORM ECONOMY COME FROM?
The trend toward fragmented and insecure work arrangements is not new. As Gerald Davis, 
Professor at the University of Michigan Ross School of Business describes:
At this writing, the combined global workforces of Facebook, Yelp, Zanga, LinkedIn, 
Zillow, Tableau, Zulily, and Box are smaller than the number of people who lost their 
jobs when Circuit City was liquidated in 2009. Throw in Google and it’s still less 
than the number who worked at Blockbuster in 2005. There is little reason to expect 
these new technology firms to grow into country-spanning institutions like Kodak or 
Westinghouse.46 
David Weil, the former Wage and Hour Division Administrator in the Obama Administration, 
linked this trend toward smaller companies with smaller workforces to the collapsing 
employment relationship between labor and management. According to Weil, the primacy of 
financial short-termism, franchise contracts, and lack of labor law reform has created a ‘fissured 
workplace,’ where organizations break into smaller and smaller pieces to avoid regulations 
and liability.47 This shift has occurred across industries and professions, with roughly 45% of 
accountants, 50% of IT workers, and 70% of truck drivers working as independent contractors. 
In the hospitality industry, outside firms supervise more than 80% of staff employed by hotel 
franchises.
Technology did not create the impulse for the “gig” economy, but it did make it easier to 
accomplish. Algorithmic management and new digital surveillance technology means fewer 
people are required to monitor, compensate, discipline, and manage a growing fleet of 
contractors. Today, Uber has more “driver partners” than General Motors has employees, 
but Uber monitors their “driver partners” with fewer than 3,000 employees.48 Algorithmic 
management has created a new means for employers to operate, requiring us to reevaluate 
how technology has shifted the relationship between workers and firms.
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WHAT CAN BE DONE?
The central challenge is recognizing how employer control operates on on-demand platforms. 
As one researcher observes, the platforms have deconstructed the bilateral employment 
relationship while still maintaining tight control over labor.49 Across “gig” platforms, this is readily 
apparent: the Uber driver also works for Lyft. The Care.com worker can also spend time on 
Amazon Mechanical Turk. The Upwork worker also makes money from Wag. 
When workers can simultaneously move between multiple companies, it poses a challenge to 
how we normally think about employer control at work. Traditionally, the American industrial 
system thinks about control through the lens of directive control.50 Under this arrangement, 
managers retain the right to give orders, such as setting schedules, disciplining workers, and 
requiring overtime, but claiming directive control allows workers to avail themselves of the 
rights and privileges of being an employee (e.g., organizing a union, overtime wages, non-
discrimination, etc.). The creation of algorithmic management has allowed companies to 
loosen their requirements around when to work but still maintain strict control over how to 
work. This changes the location of control. Instead of directing workers with guidance from an 
in-person supervisor, on-demand platform companies limit worker’s autonomy by restricting 
what information is available to them when working.51 For example, by not telling drivers 
passengers’ destination before a pickup (e.g., how much drivers will make for that job), Uber is 
able to force drivers to accept low-value rides while still giving drivers the “autonomy” to work 
“whenever they want.” 
Globally, the world is converging on an elegant solution to empower workers: grant them 
employee status.52 From California to the UK, courts have turned their eye from the glossy 
technological finish of these companies to how they write their algorithms. As several experts 
have argued, platforms should be free to set up their networks as they see fit, but the type of 
relationship that platforms construct out of these design decisions should be viewed as work 
rules, not as merely neutral choices or markets.53
This report will help inform the debate surrounding labor rights in the on-demand platform 
economy. Furthermore, it will outline various legislative approaches to establishing meaningful, 
dignified work in this space.
The longer that platforms are allowed 
to pass these costs onto consumers and 
communities, the harder it will be to curb 
these behaviors later.
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NOW IS THE KEY TIME
The longer that platforms are allowed to pass these costs onto consumers and communities, the 
harder it will be to curb these behaviors later. Both economic theory and practical experience 
suggest that now is the key time to act. Platform scholars argue that these companies will 
converge into a single organization.54 The same economic logic that created a central online 
search platform (Google), microblogging (Twitter), and online auction (eBay), is also guiding the 
path of on-demand labor platforms. So far academics’ prediction that platforms converge into 
monopolies has largely proven true.
When on-demand labor platforms converge into either a monopsony or a monopoly, they are 
able to act with significant market power and are likely to cut workers’ wages and raise prices on 
customers and cities. For example, after Uber left China, Didi was the main ride hail platform in the 
country. Just as predicted, Didi drivers report being offered fewer promotions and incentives while 
customers report higher prices for a ride.55 
In the United States, cities are beginning to depend on ride hail platforms to fill in for their existing 
transportation infrastructure gaps. In cities around the world, Uber has used this dependence to 
diffuse or entirely halt regulations in the industry.56 Once a single ride hailing platform, domestic 
work platform, or cleaning service platform emerges, these platforms will be able to quickly 
threaten to shut down operation in a city in order to pressure elected officials into inaction. Uber 
and Lyft have already shown they are willing to do this in cities like Austin and New York, with 
some degree of success.57
This report looks more deeply at many of these issues. We begin below with a more detailed 
description of the difficulties involved in counting on-demand platform workers in New York state. 
We then lay out the findings of our qualitative research on the problems faced by these workers in 
our state. Finally, the report outlines a plan of legislative action so that New York can rebalance the 
relationship between labor and on demand platforms.
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PROBLEMS COUNTING ON-DEMAND  
PLATFORM WORKERS
The category of on-demand platform workers may not be something new, but concrete 
estimates of how many of these workers operate in the U.S. economy remain scarce and 
should be interpreted with caution. Statistical data on such workers in New York state remains 
even rarer. This section summarizes some recent estimates of on-demand platform workers in 
the United States, outlines some of the measurement challenges of these estimates, and then 
highlights features of some of these quantitative data used to assemble on-demand platform 
worker estimates.
CURRENT ESTIMATES OF ON-DEMAND PLATFORM WORKERS
Thus far, no official “governmental” or “academic” definition of what we mean by an on -
-demand platform worker exists. Until a consensus develops around a methodological and 
definitional category for on-demand platform workers, it remains difficult to make an apples-
to-apples comparison between estimates developed by different researchers through different 
statistical data. Therefore, we tend to agree with estimates that on demand platform workers 
likely make up approximately 0.5 percent to 1.6 percent of all U.S. workers, or approximately 
750,000 to 2.4 million workers.58 These numbers are likely to increase even further. According 
to a JP Morgan Chase Institute report, on -demand platform workers as a share of total 
employment increased from 0.1 percent in 2012 to 1.6 percent in 2018.59
Unfortunately, state-level estimates of on-demand platform workers do not yet exist. Crucially, 
on -demand platform work appears as if it will not replace full-time employment anytime 
soon. On-demand platform workers often treat their work as a secondary source of income 
or part-time work. The average on-demand platform worker earned $500 per month from 
digitally-enabled platforms and that accounted for approximately a quarter of their total monthly 
income.60 Many on-demand platform workers earn little, with about 40 percent of them making 
less than $20,000 a year in gross income.61 Yet, digitally-enabled platforms offer the flexibility 
for on-demand platform workers to earn income from multiple sources. About 15 percent of 
on-demand platform workers receive income from more than one digital platform a month.62 
We found similar characteristics in our survey, though we too are unable currently to provide 
insight into the exact number of on-demand platform workers in New York state. Although 
existing statistics provide a broad picture about the current state of on-demand platform 
workers, lack of a consensus definition over who exactly is an on-demand platform worker 
remains a hurdle.
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DEFINING THE ON-DEMAND PLATFORM WORKER
Multiple reports, studies, and surveys typically start by defining an on-demand platform worker 
as part of the independent contractor or self-employed worker category. But this is where 
the similarities tend to end and different measurement questions emerge. Some researchers 
only examine workers that use specific digital platforms while others use broad categories of 
independent contractors or self-employed workers.
The key question is how many on-demand platform workers are there and what are the 
characteristics of their work. This is especially important if workers participate in on-demand 
platform work as a substitute to traditional full-time work. On the other hand, workers at 
the periphery of the on-demand platform economy may be even harder to capture. For 
these workers, on-demand platform work may be a secondary occupation, a part-time 
occupation, or even a hobby. In determining who is or is not an on-demand platform 
worker, where do the limits of on-demand platform work end? In cases where workers do 
not derive their main income from digital platforms, should workers who make 1 percent 
of their income from digital platforms versus 49 percent be identified as different from one 
another? Then there are trickier classification questions. If an on-demand platform worker 
generates income from multiple digital platforms, how do we classify this on-demand 
platform worker’s occupation (e.g., the worker drives for Uber and sells crafts on Etsy); what 
industry does this on-demand platform worker belong in; e.g., is the worker part of the 
information sector (since such platforms are Internet-based) or part of the transport sector 
or part of the services sector? 
These are but a handful of the important but necessary questions that need to be 
answered to better understand on-demand platform workers. Even as policy makers and 
researchers try to develop a consensus around what defines an on-demand platform 
worker, improvements to statistical data collection and methodology should help allow us to 
understand on-demand platform worker trends better.
DATA SOURCES FOR ESTIMATING ON-DEMAND PLATFORM 
WORKERS
Cornell University’s School of Industrial and Labor Relations in conjunction with the Aspen 
Institute’s Future of Work Initiative launched the Gig Economy Data Hub in 2018 to keep 
track of research advances in measuring “gig workers.”63 This useful resource catalogues 
different data sources and “gig” worker research that have emerged out of these various 
types of data. Other research has also greatly detailed some of the measurement 
challenges that these various types of data pose for estimating on-demand platform 
workers and suggest linking multiple federal data sources together in order to overcome 
weaknesses inherent in single data sources.64 In this section, we briefly highlight three types 
of data and how they have been used to create estimates of on- demand platform workers.
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Public suRVey data
The U.S. Census Bureau’s annual American Community Survey (ACS) and U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics’ monthly Current Population Survey (CPS) create some of the most easily 
accessible public data on workers. But these surveys have not asked very detailed questions 
about non-traditional work such as work done by on-demand platform workers. The most 
recent advances in measuring on-demand platform workers came about in the May 2017 
CPS which included four questions about digitally-enabled work for that month’s survey.65 
From this survey, the Bureau estimated that approximately 1.6 million workers in the nation 
participated in the economy as on-demand platform workers. This survey’s greatest strength 
is that it was able to provide key demographic information (age, gender, race, occupation, 
industry, and education) about on-demand platform workers and whether this was full-time 
or part-time work for them. The survey did not ask, however, about income derived from on-
demand platforms. Also, the survey asked respondents whether they engaged in digitally-
enabled work in the past week; since we know that many workers engage in digitally-enabled 
work infrequently, the CPS likely underestimates the total number of on-demand platform 
workers. The CPS also found that many workers responded incorrectly to the questions asked, 
requiring them to recode the original data. Although this one-time addition about digitally-
enabled work to the CPS provides a useful snapshot about the on-demand platform workers, 
it is our hope that the Census Bureau adds similar questions to the ACS or the 2020 Census 
and that the Bureau of Labor Statistics continues to include questions about digitally-enabled 
work in future CPS editions.66
Researchers have also deployed smaller-scale surveys. For example, Lawrence Katz and Alan 
Krueger of the National Bureau of Economic Research partnered with the RAND corporation 
to survey approximately 4,000 individuals on digitally-enabled work in 2015. They estimated 
that on-demand platform workers made up approximately 0.5 percent of all workers.67 
Notably, they did not construct their sample to reflect national demographic characteristics. 
inteRnal ReVenue seRVice (iRs) tax data
Self-employed and independent worker tax filings provide a rich source of data to estimate 
the number of on-demand platform workers in the economy and their incomes. But in 
contrast to public survey data, individual tax records are not public information and contain 
fewer demographic indicators than the above-mentioned surveys. Furthermore, tax forms 
do not have exclusive entry lines to document income received through digitally-enabled 
work (mainly because from a tax perspective, there is no reason to treat income earned from 
digitally-enabled work differently than income earned from traditional means). Unless the IRS 
changes tax forms to delineate non traditional work arrangements, researchers have to depend 
on creative methodologies to create on-demand platform worker estimates from tax data.
The only example of this is work done under the auspices of the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury’s Office of Tax Analysis. They examined 2014’s income tax filings and identified 
“gig workers” by looking for key terms in a filing’s “principle business or profession” entry 
or cross-referencing a filing’s source of income from a list of 25 pre identified digital platform 
companies. Their analysis suggests that “gig” workers make up 0.7 percent of all workers 
(which they suggest is a likely underestimate).68 One lingering question surrounding this 
methodology is whether all on-demand platform workers file their tax returns. Confidentiality 
concerns mean that microdata (such as these individual tax filings) are not available for public 
use.
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PRiVate data
Several estimates have emerged out of consultancy groups or researchers working with 
private industry to get a better understanding of emerging trends. Such work includes 
surveys of digital platform companies and analyses of company data on workers who 
provide services through their platforms.
One interesting example is an analysis of bank checking accounts by JP Morgan 
Chase Institute. Researchers from the Institute examined 39 million Chase checking 
accounts from 2012 to 2018 to assemble a dataset of 2.3 million individuals that used 
at least one of 128 digital platforms for on-demand platform work over this period. 
In other words, they examined a customer account’s inflow transactions from these 
digital platforms to understand how much on-demand platform workers earned from 
different digital platforms and any longitudinal trends associated with these digitally-
enabled income streams. They have released a yearly report on this dataset since 
2016, and in their most recent report published in September 2018, they estimate 
that on-demand platform workers have grown from less than .1% in 2012 to just over 
1.6 percent of all workers in 2018.69 This report provides several interesting findings. 
First, they found that on-demand platform workers that make use of transport digital 
platforms outnumber on-demand platform workers that earn income from other types 
of digital platforms. Secondly, they discovered that the vast majority - 60 to 70 percent 
- of on-demand platform workers are only active on these digital platforms for one to 
three months out of a year. Thirdly, they argue that an increased supply of on- demand 
platform workers offering transportation services has resulted in decreased average 
earnings for this category of on-demand platform workers. This private dataset offers 
the only longitudinal data currently available on on-demand platform workers, but it 
lacks demographic data and raises questions on whether conclusions derived from 
only Chase account holders can be mapped onto workers across the rest of the United 
States.
Given these difficulties in counting accurately the number of individuals involved in on-
demand platform work, the authors of this report chose to focus on more qualitative 
ways to understand the impact of these new forms of employment on New York state’s 
workers.
This section of the report examines the experiences of NYS on-demand platform workers. 
The data for this qualitative descriptive analysis originates from primary and secondary 
sources: 163 survey responses, 12 semi-structured worker interviews, review of hundreds 
of worker online postings commenting on their experience working for the platforms, and 
existing ethnographic research on the impact of digital platforms on labor. (See Appendix A 
for more information on The Worker Institute’s New York State App Workers Survey.)
On-demand platform workers are instead subject 
to employer control over pay, safety, access to 
information, performance monitoring and evaluation, as 
well as discipline and discharge.
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NEW YORK STATE WORKERS’ 
EXPERIENCES WITH ON-DEMAND 
PLATFORMS
The digital platforms that this research examined operate in the following industry sectors 
across New York state: ride hailing, delivery couriers (food and other goods), home and 
personal services (child/elder care, housecleaning, home improvement, pet-sitting, etc.), and 
professional/clerical services.
This research identified pressing workplace issues facing on-demand workers, with a focus 
on the degree of control exerted by the platforms, the performance review systems they have 
in place (including lowering workers’ pay for poor performance, disciplining or suspending 
workers) and the imposition of work rules and requirements.
WORKER ISSUES
Themes that emerged from the analysis of worker data included issues related to pay, 
workplace safety, performance evaluation systems, platforms’ control over information about 
job opportunities, and lack of communication channels for workers to contact the companies.
Pay issues
Widespread pay issues among on-demand platform workers who participated in the Cornell 
research and in other studies include low and unstable earnings, and lack of benefits. 
According to app workers’ comments, low earnings result in part from the commissions 
taken by the platforms and in part from underemployment, as the platforms do not generate 
enough work for workers to make a living wage.
In the ride hailing sector, platforms charge commissions ranging from 10% to 25%, and 
in addition they charge booking fees. Self-reported surveys from ride hail drivers suggest 
that drivers make around $15.68 per hour before vehicle related expenses.70 Uber funded 
research has reported higher earnings, but there is significant debate around their methods 
and benchmarks.71 Couriers working for food and other goods delivery platforms (e.g. 
UberEATS, Postmates, or Instacart) get paid by order or delivery. This rate ranges from $4 to 
about $16 per delivery, and they do not always get tips from the customers. Home service 
workers report that they can make from $30 to $80 per job and complain that platforms 
such as Handy take significant amounts in commission and penalty fees against workers.
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                    Comments
Ride Hailing
Foods/good 
deliveRy
“Not regular pay. No benefits”
“... you may make $25 in 3 hours which is way lower than the minimum wage. People 
who are smart enough don’t really want to waste their time and gas for this kind of work 
unless they have nothing else to supplement their income.”
“Uber will not get you far the wages were sporadic.”
“I have to work very uncomfortable hours; late nights, give up weekends and any 
holidays to make a living wage. If there are no surges or bonuses this job is extremely 
depressing and not worth it, but it does provide at least an avenue to obtaining “some” 
money when I really need it.”
“You do not make money from this job [after] car insurance, maintenance and TLC costs, 
and police tickets and TLC tickets, and car payments. You do not make it, but you could 
pay for the car.”
“Awful for dashing in the Rochester, NY area too many drivers hired and no orders 
sometimes all day and even for days on end”
“I can’t believe they already over hired and not enough customers in my city for the 
drivers to all get a single delivery in a day”
“Not making enough money or receiving enough deliveries.”
“No benefits.”
“I am a 5-star dasher with over 200 deliveries 100% Completion rate and did my 
absolute best with the company but receiving checks at the end of the week for less than 
300$ is hard when you consider food/repairs/bills and rent.”
“Working 40 hours a week will not land you more than $350-400 a week. On the 
website it advertises $1,700 a week, which is unrealistic.”
“Not a living wage, courier pays for all tax/vehicle/accident/ insurance expenses, not 
reliable money”
Industry/ 
seCtor
Because the business model of many platforms relies on supplying a large pool of service 
providers (workers), they create an excess supply of workers, resulting in significant 
underemployment for app workers and downward pressure on their earnings. Most workers 
complain that the pay is low and unreliable as a source of income, because they do not get 
enough work through the platforms. Some of the comments posted online and through the 
Worker Institute survey in relation to pay and low employment levels include the following:
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                    Comments
“I had to drive 25 minutes away to make a delivery for this god-awful company and 
they only paid me $7, that’s barely enough for the gas I wasted”
“There were times that I was paid $4/hour and wasted a whole tank of gas in two 
hours. If you are delivery only, they pay you $2.25 per delivery. If you are driving twenty 
minutes to the store to pick up and scan heavy bags of groceries that someone else 
bagged. Then drive twenty minutes to the customer’s house. Then run heavy bags 
of groceries from the car to the house. Then get a bad rating because something is 
missing or damaged when you didn’t even bag the items. If the customer doesn’t tip, 
you just made $2.25 in an hour! Plus, your car endured the wear and tear and you 
wasted a lot of gas.”
“Underpaid! Have to pay a $20 for a background check as well as pay for your own 
cleaning supplies. No benefits at all!”
Home and 
Personal Care 
Services
Professional/
clerical
services
“It’s way too competitive to try and work for 5 dollars on various services. And it seems 
like the few at the top get all the work. Very sad.”
“Low Pay, Hard to find High-Paying Jobs” 
Source: Online postings  compiled from company reviews on Indeed.com. Worker Institute 
fellows Yoorie Chang, Jaylexia Clark, Dillon Jones, and Tyler Rodriguez compiled the reviews 
between August and November 2018. 
“Cash is low not a lot of job opportunities”
“Not enough hours’”
“The hardest part of the job however was when there was no work for you to claim or 
when you did claim work and it ended up getting cancelled.”
“No benefits, no stability (jobs are not always available), no management or customer 
service, no training for staff, unrealistic expectations sold to customers and employees”
“I also think the fees are a bit high. For a company that is just a middle person, they 
take a lot out of the pay of the sitter.”
“Adding on to that, even though you are able to set your rate preference ($), you 
have to keep it as lower as other pet sitter became otherwise you won’t have any 
costumers.”
“Not Happy. It was virtually impossible for me to find a job as a home health aide. You 
have to pay to communicate with customers & the jobs don’t always materialize.”
Industry/ 
seCtor
Comments
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Due to the minimal hours of work obtained through platforms, on-demand platform workers 
often work for multiple platforms or combine their earnings with those of their spouses/partners 
to make a living wage. Results from the Worker Institute survey indicate that sixty-two percent 
of respondents worked through multiple platforms, with one of the respondents working 
through up to six platforms. Thirteen percent of survey respondents said they could support 
themselves fully with on-demand platform work, 42 percent said they also relied on income 
from another job, 13 percent combined their income with their partner or spouse, and 27 
percent indicated that they received supplemental income from social security and other non-
specified sources. This finding is consistent with existing research on the Los Angeles market, 
which estimated that 20 percent of ride hailing workers rely on public aid,72 which represents a 
significant cost shifting from the platform companies onto workers and the broader community.
Has another job
42%
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WoRkPlace safety 
Platform workers experience a range of workplace safety issues, which may relate to the type 
of work they do (e.g. delivery workers who ride their bikes in city traffic), or to the automated 
systems that the platforms use to match workers with consumers. Because the platforms they 
work for do not provide benefits or contribute to worker compensation funds, the safety issues 
described below remain ubiquitous. Workers riding bikes to deliver goods for platforms such 
as UberEATS, Postmates, Caviar or Doordash, are exposed to risk of severe injuries, which can 
prevent them from working for extended periods of time, even months, without health insurance 
or any financial cushion. One such worker, for example, reported having to move back with his 
parents out of state due to the severe injuries he endured while doing delivery work in New York 
City.73 Delivery workers also post comments on issues such as having to ride their bikes in rough 
weather conditions or at night time, which adds to the risk of injuries. Demand for food delivery in 
New York City peaks during lunch time and during the night time, from 6 pm to12 midnight.
Home service workers such as home care workers and cleaners engaged through Handy, 
TaskRabbit or care.com are vulnerable to harassment, exposure to toxic chemicals, and risk 
of injuries.74 As a result of the automated matching system (i.e. blind match between workers 
and customers), platform workers in home service and in ride hailing face the issue of dealing 
with customers who are belligerent or who make them feel unsafe. In addition, the performance 
metrics used by the platforms rely entirely on consumer ratings of the workers’ services. In the 
home services sector, this rating-based management system pressures the worker to comply with 
consumers’ requests regardless of the risks involved. Home service workers face high levels of 
uncertainty accepting jobs, claiming that clients can misrepresent the work to be performed.75
Women driving for ride hailing companies are particularly vulnerable to sexual harassment. A 
woman driver in the Albany area expressed concerns about forms of sexual harassment she 
experienced from male clients:
“I had a group of four young men in my car. I told them they were not allowed to 
smoke or vape in my car. They then proceeded to ask if it was okay if they [engaged 
in sexual acts] in my car…then, just two weeks ago, I had a passenger, [who] tried 
to friend me on Facebook. So, in those situations…I think they should have…a system 
[whereby] if you rank this customer three stars or lower, they will never match you 
with this customer again. Lyft seems to have something like that. Uber doesn’t say 
anything like that to you. So, I have no idea if these customers are ever going to be 
matched up with me or not.”76 
As a means of self-protection, ride hailing drivers in some parts of the state use dashboard 
cameras, which they purchase with their own funds.77 Drivers also believe that ride hailing 
companies should have better onboarding practices for new drivers, so that they know how to 
address potentially unsafe or conflictive situations.78 
Some workers offered a different perspective on workplace safety, noting that platforms have 
introduced safety improvements in some occupations. For instance, some ride hailing drivers 
feel that the platforms have improved safety in comparison to the working conditions of yellow 
cab and black car drivers (particularly those working in relatively unsafe urban areas) in two 
ways: collecting information about the clients and eliminating cash transactions. Some home 
service workers feel safer knowing that care.com monitors phone calls and messaging with 
clients, compared to looking for work online with Craigslist.79 These types of practices should be 
expanded and emulated by more platforms when possible.
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PeRfoRmance 
eValuation and 
disciPline
The performance 
evaluation methods 
that platforms 
implement rely 
primarily on 
consumer ratings 
of workers’ 
performance, 
and other metrics 
such as workers’ 
acceptance rates. 
The platforms’ 
evaluation systems 
provide no 
recourse or any 
formal process to 
appeal disciplinary 
actions and 
negative ratings, or 
to resolve disputes. 
These systems are 
prevalent in most 
sectors, particularly 
in ride hailing, 
food/goods 
delivery, and home 
services. 
In ride hailing, 
drivers need to keep their rating at least at 4.6 (the maximum rate is 5) which is calculated as an 
average of 500 ratings/rides for Uber, and of 100 ratings/rides for Lyft. Low ride acceptance rates 
also affect ratings negatively, and drivers can get suspended (“deactivated”) if their ratings go 
below 4.5.80 An upstate New York driver said “they will actually lower your rating if you declined 
too many rides. Like right now I have 100 percent acceptance rating. When I initially started Uber, 
I was having trouble balancing the two apps. Now I think I’ve got it down to a science. …at one 
point my rate dropped really low, and the app kind of said your acceptance rate is really low.” 
Food delivery workers’ performance evaluations are also based on consumer reviews. In-home 
service platforms such as Handy also charge cancellation fees to workers, ranging from $10 to 
$50, depending on when workers cancel the job. 
Across the board, workers complain that current performance systems lack formal processes to 
challenge negative customer reviews or disciplinary actions or penalties imposed by the platforms. 
According to on-demand platform workers, it is not rare that customers would make false claims 
against a worker’s performance in order to get a refund. Some comments on this issue that 
platform workers posted online include: 
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Food/Goods 
Delivery
“Customers can lie on you and they will deactivate you.” 
“Customers kept giving me bad ratings even though I tried my best to deliver the 
things efficiently and in good condition. Which resulted in 2 suspensions from the 
platform.” 
“Lastly they deactivated my account, I called, texted, sent emails to find out what 
happened, no one ever got back, I just wanted to know if someone gave [th]em 
wrong information or something in that sense… I can[not] step in, and have my say. 
No word from Shipt, I was left there hanging. That’s very wrong.” 
Home Services “…there are also instances …where you can get wrongfully charged after working 
hard all day and even accused by clients of not performing duties so that they can 
get a free cleaning.”
“You are always guilty …until proven innocent. They will make judgments on their 
employees before even talk[ing] with them. Never seen anything like it in my 27 
years of professional work in the work force.”
“Not a job to pay bills… your schedule changes daily you can’t make decent money 
and the bookings are very low. We as contractors get charged a cancel fee while 
the customers cancel same day and we only get partial pay. it’s hard to move up 
the ladder to receive more money and our rating goes down no matter how much 
we work or how good we are.” 
Ride Hailing “…I think they always just take the rider’s word for whatever they happen to say. So 
they can call and say my driver was drunk, and the app deactivates your account, 
which I understand but they should investigate the case. There are also riders that 
are frequently making [false] claims like that…. They’re just trying to get a free ride, 
so they’ll call them and say ‘oh my driver is like playing with his phone or doing 
something…’ They just want compensation or get the ride for free. The companies 
also have to like, you know, let the customers know that they can’t just call… There’s 
no real feedback in it, and it’s just people can just leave a number for no reason.”81 
 
Professional/
Clerical Services 
 
“Clients are often terrible, and if there are problems, Fiverr will side with the client 
even when they’re wrong, scamming, or even downright abusive. If you can, avoid 
freelancing on Fiverr.”
                    CommentsIndustry/ 
seCtor
Source: Online worker postings on Indeed.com, unless indicated otherwise. Postings were 
compiled by Worker Institute fellows Yoorie Chang, Jaylexia Clark, Dillon Jones, and Tyler 
Rodriguez, between August and November 2018. 
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InformatIon/CommunICatIon asymmetrIes 
The practice of automated matching between workers and consumers, or blind dispatch, 
results in information asymmetries that can negatively affect workers’ earnings and even 
their personal safety. Automated matching also de facto transfers the costs of the platforms’ 
inefficient systems onto the on-demand platform workers. Blind dispatch is frequent among 
platforms in ride hailing (Uber, Lyft), delivery (UberEATS), and home services (Handy). 
In ride hailing, blind dispatch results in driver uncertainty about earnings or expenses to be 
incurred in rides, because they do not know about the distance they will travel until after they 
accept the trip. Drivers also absorb the costs of the inefficiencies in the platform systems 
when they have to wait for customers to leave their house and get in the car. Although drivers 
have developed strategies (e.g. declining rides that might represent a waste of resources, or 
alerting the client well in advance that they have arrived at the pick-up location), the issues are 
systemic and remain largely unaddressed by the platforms. The following comments extracted 
from app driver interviews conducted as part of this study illustrate these points:
“…say I try to avoid, no offense, riders who want to go down to New York City. It’s 
about a three to four-hour ride down there, and another four-hour ride back. I know I 
don’t have the time in the day to do that during a workday in Albany. I can work more 
in Albany. …we don’t get to choose our passengers and that’s fine. …I understand we 
don’t get a chance to discriminate but …having the ability to pick how far we’re willing 
to go in a day. Yeah, should be something that’s available to us.”82
“…it can happen that the rides only pay five bucks and it takes a lot of your time in 
traffic.  Time does not factor in.”83 
“You don’t want to drive far away to pick somebody up or nobody. So, I don’t accept 
drives of no more than like 10 minutes away from me …because you’ll drive 20 
minutes to get somebody who will be going down the street and I will make a $3 off 
the ride... The other thing is that I would like to get paid for like waiting for a passenger. 
So, you pull up to pick them up, and it takes them five or six minutes to get out of their 
house. I think you should be paid a little more because it’s just time you’re sitting there 
and waiting and missing other rides.”84
In food delivery, UberEATS and Doordash couriers do not know where the drop off location 
is until after they accept and pick up the order.85 While some food delivery apps no longer 
implement blind dispatch, UberEATS has argued that they keep this practice to avoid what can 
be conceived as a form of discrimination when food couriers decline orders based on the 
particular restaurant or drop-off address.86 On the issue of inefficient dispatching practices, food 
delivery workers posted the following comments online:87 
“they do make u think before u accept order, [that the] restaurant is only 5 mile[s] 
away or 10 min. drive, okay? You hit accept button then u notice restaurant is really 
9 mile[s] away and 15 min. drive. Like make sure to look up restaurant address on 
google maps app and not through Doordash app before u click accept. I feel so 
deceived. They [are] taking people[‘s] gas, and using their resources. [A]t least just be 
honest Doordash.” 
“On top of waiting for Doordash to place orders, they place the order extremely late, 
giving the dashers little to no time to deliver which in return makes the customers give 
DASHERs low star ratings, but it’s not even the DASHERs fault.”
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“This is supposed to be a work experience where you are less stressed and have the 
freedom and flexibility to work whenever it’s convenient for you, but instead when you 
claim a booking and depending on the location, you don’t know exactly where you are 
going until 3-4 hours before the job starts. Therefore, if it’s at a location where it’s difficult 
to find parking and the customer choses to reschedule… but yet reports you as a no-
show. So you will incur a $50 fee versus them paying for cancelling.”90
Of key importance are the safety implications of the information asymmetry that blind dispatch 
involves. Some of the interview participants said they would like to be able to block those 
customers who made them feel uncomfortable or unsafe, and some also felt that drivers 
experience stricter demands in terms of transparency and accountability than the companies or 
the customers. One ride hail driver commented on this issue as follows: 
“A lot of times the only information we get from a passenger [is] a name, …and even 
though we don’t get real names all the time, the company requires my personal license 
posted… if the driver has to put up their license and their street address and everything 
like that to just sign up for the company…the passengers should also have to do the 
same because that’s a stranger getting on my car.”88
In the home service sector, some platforms (e.g. Handy) maintain close control of the 
communications between workers and clients through their messaging systems. From the 
platform’s point of view, the purpose of this type of control over communications is to prevent 
workers from establishing their own relationships with clients outside of the platform. However, 
by blocking information about clients and the specific tasks to be performed, the platforms also 
create safety risks for workers who may not bring the tools or protective equipment needed to 
do the work, which could result in conflictive situations with customers. Previous studies found 
that some platform workers in home service prefer Craigslist to Handy, as the former provides 
them with the opportunity to vet potentially conflictive clients directly by phone.89 One home 
service app worker posted the following comment online:
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The information asymmetry resulting from the platform’s control over job opportunities also creates 
issues of distrust toward the companies. For instance, some delivery workers feel that platforms 
block information from them when they are about to achieve the number of orders needed to get 
a bonus.91 A courier commented online: “when it’s time to meet [the] quota for certain amount of 
deliver[ie]s, phone starts to slow down, like they don’t want you to make the quota. As soon as 
time is up I would get a[n] alert, so it’s a setup.”92  
In addition to these issues, app workers expressed concerns about inadequate communication 
channels to get support from the companies, and feeling disrespected by the clients and the 
platforms.93
Control and dIsCIplIne 
The platforms exert varying degrees of control in assigning work and disciplining workers. 
This can be illustrated on a continuum between strict automated control systems (algorithmic 
management) and simple mediation (between consumers and service providers). Across this 
continuum, platforms transfer or externalize risks onto workers, but those platforms utilizing 
algorithmic management can maximize control over the labor process. 
The risks that platforms externalize involve demand fluctuations and investments in equipment 
and labor time. Platforms maximize control by monopolizing information about the demand for 
labor (clients and tasks), which determines when the work will be performed, and by monitoring 
performance through systems of ratings and penalties. Based on a continuum of control to simple 
intermediation, platforms can be classified into three categories, as shown on the following table: 
algorithmic management, marketplace management, and marketplace mediation.
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algorIthmIC management
Platforms using algorithmic management combine two mechanisms of control over the 
workforce: automated matching and performance metrics. This type of management is most 
typical in ride hailing and goods/food delivery. Automated matching (or blind dispatch) 
represents an element of control in as much as it involves information asymmetry and lack 
of transparency with respect to the availability of earning opportunities for app workers. For 
instance, food delivery workers complain about UberEATS’ blind dispatch practice arguing that 
since they are categorized as independent contractors, they should be given the option to make 
decisions about accepting or declining orders.94 Platforms offer flexibility to workers, but this is 
largely a false sense of freedom, as platform workers need to be on-call and available when 
demand for their services will surge.95
 
In some cases, the automated dispatching results in significant inefficiencies, the cost of which is 
largely borne by the app workers. On this, a food delivery worker from the state’s Capital Region 
noted: 
“I think they need to work on their algorithms, …because they have so many drivers that 
they should be able to send …a driver that’s near a bunch of restaurants to one of those 
restaurants close to [the driver], as opposed to like all the way across town and then the 
food might be late and it might get cold and you’re wasting a lot of gas. So they should 
try to send you to a nearby restaurant when possible. That’s a big issue, especially when 
there’s a lot of traffic too. 
…also a big issue is getting a good amount of offers that are… not you being sent all 
around town to burn up a lot of gas. …they only calculate the distance from the restaurant 
to the diner/client and then draw a straight line from each of them. So it’s not taking 
into account all of the turns that you’re making. Grubhub pays you $3.25 for a delivery 
process, and I believe it’s like fifty cents a mile or something like that. But the mileage 
isn’t like what you’re actually driving. It’s just the straight line distance to the restaurant…”96 
 
The performance monitoring mechanisms involve worker average ratings, which are calculated 
considering consumer ratings/reviews, ride/delivery acceptance, and cancellation rates. If 
workers fall below a certain rating threshold, they might get suspended or “deactivated” from 
the platforms. Although platforms do not always provide training or clear guidelines on how to 
do the work, factors such as consumer reviews, timeliness, and quality of the service have a 
direct effect on workers’ ratings. Uber, for instance, tracks the driver’s location with GPS systems 
and even monitors the use of the car brakes.97 Both Uber and Lyft also have thresholds for the 
number of hours workers can access the platform to avoid driver exhaustion. 
In the case of food delivery workers, the platforms provide them with bags, and in some cases 
use of the bags is required per the contract between the worker and the platform “to keep the 
food warm.”98 On the issue of work guidelines, a courier posted online:
“…then there’s the standards and metrics you have to adhere to and obey to not get 
a bad review from a customer. Even if you do try to go by the guidelines, I got bad 
reviews. did my best but gosh! too much for the pay.”99
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Marketplace ManageMent
These platforms exert control over workers by monitoring performance and imposing penalties on 
workers for cancelling appointments or not showing up for jobs. Some platforms also fix workers’ 
hourly rates. These platforms’ revenue flows involve commissions and penalties and depend on 
maintaining control over the hiring process and the worker-client relationship. This management 
modality appears more frequently among platforms in the home services sector (Handy, TaskRabbit) 
and in some professional services platforms (Talkspace). Some platforms suggest that workers take 
online training on the quality standards they must maintain to continue working through the platform 
(Handy).   
Marketplace Mediation
These platforms engage in matching and some aspects of the hiring process, but do not get 
involved in managing workers’ performance. They provide profiles, rating systems (consumer 
reviews), and background checks. Their business models involve paid subscriptions for accessing 
job opportunities. Marketplace mediation is widely implemented by platforms in clerical/professional 
services (Fiverr, Talkspace), home services (UrbanSitter), and among platforms offering intermediation 
between customers and providers of hospitality and ancillary services (Airbnb, Babyquip).
The three types of managerial control of on-demand platform workers described above both clarify 
and complicate our understanding of on-demand platform work and workers.  While platforms using 
algorithmic management enforce the most control over platform workers, the continuum extending 
through marketplace management to marketplace mediation suggests how all three contribute to the 
problems described above. All three also complicate further the questions of how to classify these 
workers for the sake of making sure that they enjoy the protections and benefits due to all workers in 
New York state.
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OVERVIEW
On-demand platform work, like other forms of contingent and 
temporary employment, destabilizes industries, undermines worker 
protections and living standards, and significantly contributes to 
wealth and income inequality.  
The issues raised by the workers in our survey are frighteningly similar to those faced by 
American workers in the early 20th century. Those workers found themselves trapped in jobs 
without guarantees of minimum wages or maximum hours, without hope of payment in case of 
death or dismemberment or even protections against unsafe working conditions. It would take 
most American workers over thirty years before they gained any sort of basic workplace rights. 
From early Progressive era reforms through the New Deal reforms of the 1930s, workers 
slowly gained these rights and others, such as the right to organize collectively into unions. It 
would take another thirty to forty years or more before the federal government passed anti-
discrimination laws and that long or longer until originally excluded groups such as public 
employees, farmworkers and household workers began to gain similar rights on a state-by-
state basis.
New York state now has an opportunity to shape new laws so that on-demand platform 
workers will not have to wait thirty years or more before they too gain what we consider today 
to be basic workplace rights.
On-demand platform employment is but the latest demonstration of destabilizing changes in 
work, conditions, and labor markets that have developed since the 1980s. Companies have 
systematically shifted or eliminated jobs formerly done in-house through subcontracting, 
reliance on third parties, contingent and temporary work contracts, and abuse of “independent 
contractor” status.100 As with on-demand platform work, the industries most impacted are: 
transportation, trucking, construction, home health care, janitorial, hospitality, restaurant, 
household services, clerical, and retail services.  
ON-DEMAND EMPLOYMENT, WORKER 
MISCLASSIFICATION, AND LABOR 
STANDARDS
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appopriate classification of workers is a core issue for labor standards in the 
“on-deMand” econoMy.
On-demand industry practice, represented by such companies as Uber, Lyft, Postmates, and 
TaskRabbit, is to hire and dispatch workers as “independent contractors.” These workers are, 
however, not true “independent contractors;” they are not in business for themselves and cannot 
freely negotiate employment terms. The Worker Institute’s survey as well as documents obtained 
through litigation have shown that they are instead subject to employer control over pay, safety, 
access to information, performance monitoring and evaluation, as well as discipline and discharge. 
This type of misclassification may be mistaken or deliberate.  Some employers may mistakenly 
misclassify workers because the criteria for determining employee status are complicated and 
unclear. Other employers deliberately misclassify their workers as “independent contractors” 
as a strategy to cut labor costs and gain an unfair competitive advantage.  This shifts workers’ 
compensation and unemployment insurance premium costs onto law-abiding businesses. 
Government, at all levels, is deprived of significant revenues through non-collection or under-
reporting of taxes. And on-demand platform workers are left holding the bag.   
In an employer-employee relationship, the employer must withhold income taxes, withhold and 
pay Social Security and Medicare taxes, pay the unemployment insurance tax on wages paid, 
provide workers’ compensation insurance, pay minimum wage and overtime wages, and include 
employees in benefits 
plans.
Employers are not generally 
obligated to make these 
payments to, or on behalf 
of, independent contractors. 
They may therefore have 
a strong incentive to 
avoid having their workers 
classified as “employees.” 
Hiring independent 
contractors instead of 
“employees” can mean a 
30% reduction in payroll 
and related costs.101
“Employees” receive 
unemployment and 
workers’ compensation 
benefits and are typically 
protected by a broad 
range of federal, state, 
and local legislation 
affecting wages, health 
and safety, health benefits, 
the right to organize, anti-
discrimination, family and 
medical leave, and pension 
security.  
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“Independent contractors” are generally excluded from these social safety net programs and 
protective workforce legislation: they are “on their own.” 
A study of several states’ insurance funds conducted for the U.S. Department of Labor102 
concluded that employers will assume the risks associated with misclassification to gain a 
competitive advantage by not paying workers’ compensation premiums — risks they would not 
likely take for unemployment insurance cost savings alone. 
Misclassifying workers as independent contractors reduces liability risks for employers. In an 
employer-employee relationship, employers are liable for the torts committed by their employees 
within the scope of their employment under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Employers are, 
however, not liable for the torts of independent contractors. 
the iMpact of worker Misclassification on new york state funds and tax revenues 
is severe.
Cornell ILR reported on worker misclassification in early 2007. That earlier study, based on audits 
performed by the NYS Department of Labor Unemployment Insurance Division during the four-
year period 2002-05, estimated that: 
o nearly 40,000 employers each year mistakenly or intentionally misclassified workers; 
o 10.3% of the state’s private sector workers were misclassified each year including 14.8% of 
construction workforce; and that
o $4.3 billion of unemployment insurance taxable wages were underreported for the audited 
industries during the four-year period.103 
The use of independent contractor status, by one estimate, grew nationally by 40% between 
2005 and 2015.104 The New York State Joint Enforcement Task Force reported in 2015 that,
o Since August 2007 enforcement and data sharing activities have identified nearly 140,000 
instances of employee misclassification and discovered nearly $2.1 billion in unreported 
wages.105
The California Division of Labor and Enforcement Standards estimates that worker misclassification 
costs that state $7 billion annually with “increased reliance on the public safety net by workers... 
denied access to work-based protections.”106 
On-demand platform workers are instead subject 
to employer control over pay, safety, access 
to information, performance monitoring and 
evaluation, as well as discipline and discharge.
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new york’s regulatory structure does not now provide the necessary level of 
oversight to curb abuse in the on-deMand econoMy so as to protect worker, 
business, and taxpayer interests.
New York state has no uniform criteria for determining “employee” status. A worker may be 
adjudged to be an “employee” under one statute but an “independent contractor” under 
another.   
Decisions by one agency do not necessarily bind another and agencies are not bound by prior 
rulings. Agency decisions may be overturned by courts that reach opposite conclusions based 
on the same or similar facts.
The current structure for enforcing labor standards is so complex and confusing that it a) often 
leaves businesses and workers uncertain of proper classification short of costly, extensive 
litigation; and b) provides wide latitude for abuse by allowing employers to structure and define 
work to avoid a determination of “employee” status.  
New York courts and administrative agencies apply different versions of the “common law test” 
to determine worker status for claims involving unemployment insurance, workers’ compensation, 
wage and hour violations and taxation.  
The complex, multifactor common law tests for determining employee status are flawed because 
they provide insufficient direction to law-abiding businesses and workers pending judicial and 
administrative intervention; lack the clarity necessary to mitigate mistaken and intentional worker 
misclassification; facilitate costly and time-consuming litigation; lead to inconsistent outcomes; 
and do not offer the level of regulatory oversight necessary to protect worker, business and 
taxpayer interests.
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STATE LEGISLATURES HAVE RESPONDED TO THE PROBLEMS 
RELATED TO WORKER MISCLASSIFICATION BY TIGHTENING 
REGULATORY STANDARDS BY REPLACING THE COMMON LAW TEST 
WITH THE ABC TEST. 
Sixteen states, including New York, have changed how employment relationships are defined 
and most states have adopted some form of the ABC test that presumes employee status. 
These states are: Delaware; Illinois; Kansas; Maine; Maryland; Massachusetts; Minnesota; 
Nebraska; New Hampshire; New Jersey; New Mexico; New York; Oregon; Pennsylvania; Utah; 
and Washington.107  
The California Supreme Court recently [April 2018] rejected the Common Law test in favor 
of the ABC test.  Legislation is now pending in the California Assembly to codify the Court’s 
decision. 
New York’s statutory reforms, as with those of several other states, are industry specific: 
they are directed at those industries – construction and trucking – where intentional 
misclassification has, for several years, been particularly severe. 
New York state’s Fair Play statutes, enacted for the construction and trucking industries, use 
the alternative ABC test, the clearest and most sharply defined legal test for determining 
employee status.  These provide the model for new legislation to curb misclassification abuse 
in the on-demand industry. 
LEGALS TEST APPLIED BY COURTS AND AGENCIES TO DISTINGUISH 
“INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS” FROM “EMPLOYEES” 
The regulatory environment, the ability of state policymakers to effectively challenge worker 
misclassification, is a function of the legal tests used by courts and agencies to distinguish 
“independent contractors” from “employees.”  
Different statutes may apply different tests or a variation of the same test.  A worker may be 
adjudged to be an “employee” under one statute or one test but an “independent contractor” 
under another.  The definitions of “employment,” “employee,” and “employer” may vary by 
statute.108 It is a complex and confusing legal landscape that often leaves businesses and 
workers uncertain of proper classification short of litigation.109 
There are three categories of legal tests: 
• Common law “Right to Control” Test; 
• Economic Realities Test; and the
• ABC Test.  
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the coMMon law “right to control” test is the narrowest for finding that a worker is 
an “employee.” 
The common law test or “Right to Control” test is derived from the tort law, the need to 
determine vicarious liability for worker accidents and injuries. The employer’s right to control 
the details, the “manner and means,” of the worker’s activities is the cornerstone concept.  An 
employer’s actual exercise of control is not key. What matters is the employer’s right to give 
orders and to dictate the “means and methods” of work. The common law test is multifaceted: 
it incorporates a series of secondary factors, articulated infra, to determine a worker’s status.  
The employer, in a true independent contractor situation, does not, by contrast, have the right 
to give orders on how the contracted work is to be performed. The focus is on the work 
product or result; the method and means are typically left to the independent contractor’s 
particular skill and expertise. 
 
the econoMic realities test also weighs the employer’s right to control but only as one 
consideration; it focuses instead on the “economic realities” of the employment relationship: 
the degree to which a worker is economically dependent on the employer or is in business 
for himself or herself.  How the parties label the arrangement – as “independent contractor” or 
“employee” -- is not dispositive.
Congress intended that this more expansive test be used in lieu of the narrower common law 
standards for enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act [FLSA].  No one factor controls; 
courts look at the totality of the circumstances. While the specific articulation varies, these are 
factors typically considered: 
• the extent to which the work performed is an integral part of the employer’s busi-
ness; 
• the worker’s opportunity for profit or loss depending on his or her managerial skill; 
• the extent of the relative investments of the employer and the worker; 
• whether the work performed requires special skills and initiative; 
• the permanency of the relationship; and 
• the degree of control exercised or retained by the employer.110
 
 
the abc test presumes employer status: it shifts the burden onto the employer to show 
that the claimant worker is an independent contractor. This is the basis for recent, industry-
specific, statutory reform to address worker misclassification in many jurisdictions, including 
New York. To establish that the worker is an independent contractor, the employer must show 
all three of these elements: 
A. the individual is free from direction and control both under the contract  and in fact; 
B. the service performed is outside the employer’s usual course of business; 
C. the individual is in business for himself or herself.  
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Economic  
Realities Test
Key questions:
Is the worker economically 
dependent on the employer?
Is the worker in business for 
herself or himself? 
Totality- of-the circumstances 
analysis:  Courts examine such 
significant factors as:
• the extent to which the work 
performed is an integral part of the 
employer’s business; 
• the worker’s opportunity for 
profit or loss depending on his or 
her managerial skill; 
• the extent of the relative 
investments of the employer and 
the worker; 
• whether the work performed 
requires special skills and initiative; 
and
• the permanency of the 
relationship; and the degree of 
control exercised or retained by the 
employer.
ABC  
Test
Key question:
Can the employer overcome the 
presumption that this worker is 
an “employee”?  
To establish that the worker is an 
independent contractor and not 
an “employee,” the employer must 
show all three of these elements: 
A. the individual is free from 
direction and control applicable 
both under the contract and in fact; 
B. the service performed is 
outside the employer’s usual 
course of business; and
C. the individual is in business 
for himself or herself. 
 
Common Law  
[NYS UI] Test
Key question:
Does the employer have the 
right to control the means and 
methods of work?
Totality- of-the circumstances 
analysis:  Courts examine such 
significant factors as:
• control over a worker’s 
activities, determining hours, 
requiring attendance at meetings 
or permission for absences;
• compliance with instructions 
as to when, where, and how to do 
the work;
• providing facilities, 
equipment, tools, or supplies;
• setting the pay rate and 
controlling billing;
• furnishing business cards or 
other identification;
• restricting options to work 
for another employer; 
• the right to terminate 
employment on short notice; and
• the nature of the services 
provided, the skill level and need 
for supervision
These three tests are summarized in the following table.
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NEW YORK STATE COURTS AND AGENCIES APPLY THE COMMON  
LAW TEST
In New York state, as in other jurisdictions, different public policies underlie different statutes. In 
the absence of uniform criteria, the determination of worker status varies by the test applied. A 
person may be adjudged as an “employee” for one law and an “independent contractor” for 
another. Decisions by one agency do not necessarily bind another and agencies are not bound 
by prior rulings.111 
Agency decisions may be overturned by courts that reach opposite conclusions based on the 
same or similar facts. The complicated, multi-factor “right to control” common law test, the basis 
for most decision-making, provides an especially wide latitude for outcomes, so much so that 
it leaves both businesses and workers guessing as to the proper determination pending costly, 
extended litigation.  
The following section reviews recent determinations under relevant New York statutes. The trend 
is to hold app-based, on-demand workers as “employees” notwithstanding application of the 
narrow common law test. 
new york uneMployMent insurance claiMs
The New York Court of Appeals used the common law “right to control” test to adjudicate rights 
under the state’s Unemployment Insurance law in the 2016 decision In re Matter of Yoga Vida, 
NYC.112 The Court reversed a prior Department of Labor determination and held that the claimant 
yoga instructors were properly classified as independent contractors.  
The factual analysis showed insufficient evidence to support a finding of employee status because 
the employer did not exercise the requisite degree of control and supervision. It cited these 
factual reasons:   
• The instructors made their own schedules and chose how they were paid;
• There were no restrictions on where they could teach; and 
• Instructors were not required to attend meetings or receive training.
The Dissent however argued that the evidence did support a determination of employee status. It 
identified these factors to show sufficient employer control:
The employer recruits the clients, determines and collects the fees; it sets the class 
schedule, including what courses are taught when; instructors could not unilaterally change 
class time, length or difficulty level.   
As if to highlight the problem applying the common law test, the dissent noted:
Here, the evidence reasonably supports the Board’s conclusion that the non-staff 
instructors are Yoga Vida’s employees, “even though there is evidence in the record that 
would have supported a contrary conclusion”.113
 
The Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board has since distinguished certain on-demand work 
from Yoga Vida. Employee status was upheld using the “right to control” test in a series of 
decisions during 2017 – 18 involving TaskRabbit, Postmates, and Uber.   
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taskRabbit
TaskRabbit provides a communications platform to casual laborers (“Taskers”), whom it 
classified as “independent contractors,” for such “tasks” as furniture assembly, minor home 
repairs, and cleaning. The Board here found sufficient control and direction to support 
“employee” status and company liability for tax contributions. It noted that “this case is similar 
to those in which employment relationships were found for various categories where written 
agreements, rules and/or policies inevitably controlled, directed, or supervised the work, or 
otherwise reserved for employers the right to exercise such control over various aspects of the 
work.”114
Postmates
The Board also determined employee status in Postmates, a company whose couriers pick 
up and deliver orders placed from stores and restaurants. The couriers were free to log in 
and out of the platform at will and could work for competitors. And there was no required 
minimum acceptance rate. The employer was nevertheless held to have exercised sufficient 
supervision, direction, and control.115
Postmates workers were later [June 2018] found not to be “employees” by New York’s 
Appellate Court, 3d Division. Here the Court overturned a 2016 Unemployment Insurance 
Appeals Board decision; the Court held that the factual analysis did not find “sufficient indicia 
of control” by the company:
the fact that Postmates determines the fee to be charged, determines the rate to be 
paid, tracks the subject deliveries in real time and handles customer complaints, in our 
view, such proof does not constitute substantial evidence of an employer-employee 
relationship to the extent that it fails to provide sufficient indicia of Postmates’ control 
over the means by which these couriers perform their work.116
ubeR
In an action initiated by the New York Taxi Workers Alliance, the New York Unemployment 
Insurance Appeal Board held that Uber drivers are “employees.” Particularly notable is the 
Administrative Law Judge’s characterization of Uber’s agreements as “adhesion contracts.” 
Employing the common law “totality of the circumstances” review, ALJ Burrowes conceded 
that, 
Certainly, it is significant that as the parties agree, claimants set their own work 
schedule; selected their work areas; were not obliged by Uber to report their absences 
or other leaves; and, were not provide (sic) fringe benefits by Uber – all factors 
indicative of an independent contractor status.117
But the decision continued,
The credible evidence also establishes; however, ... that Uber exercised sufficient 
supervision and control over substantial aspect of their [the claimants] work as Drivers... 
Uber did not employ an arms’ length approach to the claimants as would typify an 
independent contractor arrangement.  Uber remained involved with the means by which 
claimants provided transportation services for its Riders.118
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ALJ Burrows distinguished the Uber case from Yoga Vida where the Court found that the 
claimant part-time instructors were independent contractors [discussed above]. The Court 
repeatedly referenced that putative employer (in Yoga Vida) had its own staff of 
instructors, and that the claimants were part-time and not subject to the employment 
rules applicable of its employees. The claimants in Yoga Vida were not therefore, a 
crucial aspect of that putative employer’s ongoing operations, as are the claimants 
here. Uber does not contend that it has its own staff of Drivers who could have 
provided services to those provided by the claimants.119
The ALJ decision and the initial Department of Labor determination were subsequently 
upheld on appeal. The Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, on July 12, 2018, ruled 
that the three Uber driver claimants were “employees” and eligible for unemployment 
insurance. The Board, affirming the ALJ decision, also concluded that the “the record, as 
a whole” provided “credible evidence... that Uber exercises sufficient supervision, direction 
or control over the three claimants and other similarly situated Drivers.” The Board provided 
additional factual analysis distinguishing the Uber case from the Court of Appeals Yoga Vida 
decision:
...unlike Yoga Vida’s distinct and different treatment between its staff and non-staff 
instructors, Uber engages only non-staff Drivers.  And unlike non-staff instructors 
who were paid only if a certain number of students attended the classes, Uber not 
only guarantees payment for each trip, but occasionally guarantees a specified level 
of income.120
The Board here specified company procedures related to training, incentives, and 
performance expectations that supported a finding of employee status; it also distinguished 
the present case from the recently decided Matter of Vega decision in which the 3d 
Department held that Postmates workers were not employees.
new york state workers’ coMpensation claiMs
New York courts, interpreting the Workers’ Compensation Law, use a hybrid of common 
law factors with a “relative nature of the work” test. As summarized 
Under the common law test “four factors are assessed”: 
(1) the direct evidence of the owner’s right to or exercise of control; 
(2) the method of payment; 
(3) the extent to which the owner furnishes equipment; and 
(4) whether the owner retains the right to discharge.
Under the ‘relative nature of work’ analysis the trial court looks to the following six 
components: 
(1) the character of the claimant’s work; 
(2) how much of a separate calling that work is from the owner’s occupation; 
(3) whether it is continuous or intermittent; 
(4) whether it is expected to be permanent; 
(5) its importance in relation to the owner’s business; and 
(6) its character in relation to whether or not the claimant should be expected 
to carry his own accident insurance burden.121
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new york state tax law enforceMent
New York state uses a twenty-factor variant of the common law test to determine employee 
status for tax law purposes that is based on the Internal Revenue Code.122 This version, as 
detailed in the endnote, is more complex than the common law tests used to determine 
worker status for unemployment insurance and workers compensation or that might be used 
to adjudicate wage and hour claims. The problem of inconsistent outcomes from applying 
different tests for different statutes is highlighted here. As one commentary noted,
It is (at least hypothetically) possible for a worker to be classified as an employee under 
the economic realities test, which would entitle her to the minimum wage and other 
mandates, but not under the tax law, which would free the employer from remitting 
payroll taxes on behalf of the worker.123  
new york state wage and hour claiMs
Wage and hour cases may apply common law standards or the economic realities test or a 
combination of the two. The following comments on selected cases illustrate how New York 
courts or federal courts (applying New York law) have dealt with status issues.    
In Bynog v. Cipriani Group, Inc.124 banquet waiters provided to Cipriani by a temporary agency 
were held to be independent contractors and denied recovery of certain payments as gratuities. 
The New York Court of Appeals here articulated and applied five common law factors: 
In an employment relationship context, factors relevant to assessing control include 
whether a worker (1) worked at his own convenience, (2) was free to engage in other 
employment, (3) received fringe benefits, (4) was on an employer’s payroll and (5) was 
on a fixed schedule.125
In Saleem, etc. v. Corporate Transportation Group, Ltd., etc.126 the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit applied an economic realities test to the overtime claims of certain black-
car limousine drivers under both the federal Fair Labor Standards Act127 and New York Labor 
Law.128 The Court held that the drivers “who owned or operated for-hire vehicle franchises” 
were independent contractors “as a matter of law.” The Court noted that 
Although the franchisor provided a dispatch system, negotiated rates with clients, and 
engaged in some monitoring and discipline of drivers, the economic reality was that the 
drivers operated like small businesses and decided how to go about their work.
A different conclusion was reached by the federal District Court for the Southern District of New 
York in Hart v. Rick’s Cabaret Int’l. Inc.  Here the Court applied an economic realities test to 
federal FLSA claims and a common law Bynog test to state labor law claims.129 The relevant 
issue was whether the plaintiff exotic dancers at the defendant employer’s strip club were 
“employees” under the statutes.  The employer claimed that the dancers were independent 
contractors. While certain factors favored the employer,130 the Court, on balance, held that the 
plaintiffs were “employees” under both statutes. The employer exercised “significant control” 
by, for example, setting work schedules, requiring dress codes, establishing weight limits, 
behavioral rules, and threats of potential discipline. 
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HigH CoURT ReJeCTion oF THe CoMMon laW TesT
u.s. supreMe court created the econoMic realities test as an alternative to 
the coMMon law
The common law multifactor tests to determine worker status on a case-by-case basis have 
long been challenging for jurists. The US Supreme Court reviewed the application of the 
common law to determine employee status under the National Labor Relations Act [NLRA].  
The 1944 NLRB v. Hearst Publications 
decision rejected the common law test 
and authorized the more expansive 
economic realities test.131
The Court held that newsboys selling 
papers on the street were, in light of 
the legislative intent behind the NLRA, 
to be considered “employees” not 
“independent contractors.”
Common law standards developed 
for tort litigation ought not to be 
applied absent consideration of the 
relevant statute’s underlying policy. 
The Court’s reasoning regarding the 
NLRA could apply equally well to 
workers misclassified by app-based 
companies and denied access to 
state-based protections and benefits 
accorded to “employees.”
california supreMe court 
rejects the coMMon law in 
favor of the abc test
Federal and state courts in California 
have been the venues for recent 
litigation involving the determination of 
worker status for delivery and app-
based services.  
The recent Federal District Court 
decision in Lawson v. Grubhub132 used 
the California [Borello] common law 
test133 to hold that a delivery driver for 
an internet food ordering service was 
properly classified as an independent 
contractor for both wage and hour and 
workers’ compensation claims. 
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The Court held that 
while some factors weighed in favor of an employment relationship, the service’s lack of all 
necessary control over the driver’s work, including how he performed deliveries and even 
whether or for how long he worked, along with other factors persuaded the court that the 
contractor classification was appropriate for the driver during his brief tenure with the service. 134
Shortly after Grubhub, the California Supreme Court issued a landmark decision sharply critical of 
Grubhub’s application of common law standards.  In Dynamex Operations West v. Superior Court135, 
decided April 30, 2018, the Court observed that the common law multifactor test: 1) does not provide 
employers and workers with sufficient clarity of status and rights prior to and without litigation; and 
2) gives employers the opportunity to structure work assignments with the intent to circumvent a 
determination of employee status.    
... a multifactor, “all the circumstances” standard makes it difficult for both hiring businesses 
and workers to determine in advance how a particular category of workers will be classified, 
frequently leaving the ultimate employee or independent contractor determination to a 
subsequent and often considerably delayed judicial decision.
In practice, the lack of an easily and consistently applied standard often leaves both businesses 
and workers in the dark with respect to basic questions relating to wages and working 
conditions that arise regularly, on a day-to-day basis.
...the use of a multifactor, all the circumstances standard affords a hiring business greater 
opportunity to evade its fundamental responsibilities under a wage and hour law by dividing its 
work force into disparate categories and varying the working conditions of individual workers 
within such categories with an eye to the many circumstances that may be relevant under the 
multifactor standard.136
Employing arguments similar to those in Hearst, The Dynamex Court rejected the common law test for 
protective legislation and here replaced it with the more inclusive ABC test that presumes employee 
status. A bill was introduced into the California Assembly on December 3, 2018 that “would codify the 
decision in the Dynamex case and clarify its application.”137 
State legislatures have responded to the problems and policy concerns raised by applying the 
common law test to protective legislation. The trend is to abandon the common test in favor of less 
complex standards more sharply crafted to better execute the legislative intent.  
This is supposed to be a work experience where 
you are less stressed and have the freedom and 
flexibility to work whenever it’s convenient for 
you, but instead when you claim a booking and depending 
on the location, you don’t know exactly where you are 
going until 3-4 hours before the job starts.
“
“
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STATUTORY REFORMS TO ADDRESS WORKER MISCLASSIFICATON: 
ABC TEST REPLACES THE COMMON LAW TEST
Significant legislative and administration action has occurred in recent years throughout 
the United States to better address worker misclassification. A heightened awareness of 
misclassification’s severe impact on state and local resources has prompted the articulation 
of clearer statutory standards and stronger enforcement mechanisms, civil penalties and/or 
criminal liability, and improved communication and coordination among government agencies.  
A 2000 study conducted for the U.S. Department of Labor138 found that 14 states, including 
New York, and the District of Columbia apply the Common Law “Right to Control,” test for 
enforcement of unemployment insurance statutes,139 22 states apply the ABC test,140 10 states 
use an adaptation of the Common Law test,141 and 4 apply the Internal Revenue 20-factor 
test.142 
While 22 states use the more expansive “ABC test” to determine employee status143, New York 
Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board and court decisions have long applied the common 
law standards.144  
Twenty-two states, including New York, enacted statutes between 2004 and 2012 that 
change the requirements for determining “independent contractor” status.145 Legislatures in 
four states - Washington State, Massachusetts, New Mexico, and Oregon - acted prior to the 
economic crisis of 2007. These states each enacted one or more laws since 2008: Minnesota; 
Connecticut; New Jersey; New Hampshire; Illinois; Indiana; Washington; Oregon (again); Maine; 
Maryland; Delaware; Vermont; Nebraska; New York; Pennsylvania; Kansas; Utah; Wisconsin; 
and California.  
Sixteen states, according to one analysis, have changed how employment relationships 
are defined146 and noted that most states have adopted some form of the ABC test with a 
presumption of employee status.147 This study found that 
The ABC test, coupled with the presumption of employee status unless the employer 
demonstrates compliance, has been the clearly favored test of state legislatures; most of 
these states adopted a clear or recognizable ABC formulation.148 
It also noted that,
...all sixteen state statutes, except for Kansas’s and Maine’s unemployment 
compensation statutes, either explicitly or implicitly made employee status the 
presumption by utilizing a list of mandatory criteria rather than a set of subjectively 
weighted factors.149
California Labor Code §2750.5 creates a rebuttable presumption of employee status for 
workers employed on jobs for which a license is required. The presumption extends to 
those hired by the unlicensed worker. The statue specifically requires that “the individual’s 
independent contractor status is bona fide and not a subterfuge to avoid employee 
status.”150 Decisions pursuant to the statute highlight liability issues impacting general 
contractors and homeowners when injuries are sustained by unlicensed subcontractors or 
individuals.151  
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Illinois’ Employee Classification Act does not specify licensure; it applies to “an individual 
performing services for a contractor (who) is deemed to be an employee of the employer.” 
Illinois’ version of the ABC test is as follows: 
An individual performing services for a contractor is deemed to be an employee of the 
contractor unless it is shown that:
 
(1) the individual has been and will continue to be free from control or direction 
over the performance of the service for the contractor, both under the individual’s 
contract of service and in fact;
(2) the service performed by the individual is outside the usual course of services 
performed by the contractor; and
(3) the individual is engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, 
profession or business; or
(4) the individual is deemed a legitimate sole proprietor or partnership...152
New Jersey’s statute is industry specific. It applies the ABC test to protect construction workers 
against misclassification. The New Jersey language is noteworthy because it is otherwise 
comprehensive: it references violations of the state’s workers’ compensation, unemployment 
insurance, disability benefits, taxation, and wage and hour laws.153
The trend toward finding employee status is also reflected in recent state-level administrative 
decisions concerning app-based work in several jurisdictions including New York.154  
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NEW YORK STATE ADOPTED THE ABC TEST IN STATUTES TO 
ADDRESS WORKER MISCLASSIFICATION IN THE CONSTRUCTION 
AND TRUCKING INDUSTRIES
New York state’s Fair Play statutes, enacted for the construction and trucking industries, use the 
alternative ABC test, the clearest and most sharply defined legal test for determining employee 
status.  These provide the model for new legislation to curb misclassification abuse in the on-
demand industry. 
the new york state construction industry fair play act (2010) and 
the new york state coMMercial goods transportation industry fair play 
act (2014)
The underlying policy and purpose of The New York Construction Industry Fair Play Act was 
stated quite clearly in the statute’s statement of Legislative findings and intent, §861-a: 
The legislature hereby finds and declares that New York state’s construction industry 
is experiencing dangerous levels of employee misclassification fraud. Unscrupulous 
employers are intentionally reporting employees as independent contractors to state and 
federal authorities or workers’ compensation carriers in record numbers. In addition, 
there has been an explosion of employers who operate in the underground economy 
and fail to report all or a sizable portion of their workers.
The legislature hereby finds and declares that recent studies of New York city’s 
construction industry alone suggests that as many as fifty thousand New York city 
construction workers-nearly one in four-are either misclassified as independent 
contractors or are employed by construction contractors completely off the books. 
Construction industry fraud reduces government revenue, shifts tax and workers’ 
compensation insurance costs to law-abiding employees, lowers working conditions 
and steals jobs from legitimate employers and their employees.
Therefore, the legislature hereby finds and declares that government has an obligation 
to curb this underground economy, enforce long-standing employment laws, ensure 
compliance with essential social insurance protections and eliminate the unfair 
competitive advantage from contractors in the underground economy by and through 
the enactment of the New York state construction industry fair play act.155
§861-c (1) articulates a presumption of employee status that incorporates a version of the ABC 
test. The same language appears as §862-b [Presumption of employment in the commercial 
goods transportation industry] in The New York State Commercial Goods Transportation 
Industry Fair Play Act (2014):
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1. Any person performing services for a contractor shall be classified as an employee 
unless the person is a separate business entity under subdivision two of this section or 
all of the following criteria are met, in which case the person shall be an independent 
contractor:
(a) the individual is free from control and direction in performing the job, both under his 
or her contract and in fact;
(b) the service must be performed outside the usual course of business for which the 
service is performed; and
 
(c) the individual is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, 
occupation, profession, or business that is similar to the service at issue.156
§861-c (2) defines “business entity.” Employers may attempt to evade statutory enforcement 
by classifying individual workers not as “independent contractors” but as independent or 
separate business entities such as limited liability corporations, franchisees, partners or owners 
of the employer’s business.157 The language protects both employers and employees: it helps 
employers who hire actual, independent business entities from having those entities improperly 
classified as “employees” and it protects employees from misclassification as independent 
contractors.158
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enfoRcement PRoVisions in neW yoRk and otheR states
§861-e provides for civil and criminal penalties for a contractor’s willful violation159 of 
unemployment insurance, workers’ compensation, and tax and finance statutes. Civil 
penalties are $2500 for the first violation per employee misclassified and up to $5000 
per employee for subsequent violations during a five-year period. Other civil penalties 
may be assessed for violation of the respective statutes. Criminal penalties include 
imprisonment for up to 30 days for a first offense and fines up to $25,000; subsequent 
offenses are imprisonment up to 60 days and fines up to $50,000.
§861-f protects claimants from retaliation. Anti-retaliation provisions exist in these three 
other states: Illinois, Delaware, and Vermont. The New York Statute protects those 
“making, or threatening to make, a complaint to an employer, co-worker or to a public 
body...” The Illinois statute includes complaints made to community organizations.160 
These six states – Delaware, Illinois, Massachusetts, Maryland, New Jersey, and 
Washington – permit workers to pursue a private right of action. The New Jersey statute 
specifically applies to construction worker plaintiffs. The Illinois statute, by contrast, has no 
such limitation. Both states permit unions to commence actions; this is useful because 
individual workers may lack the resources or be unwilling to assume the risks involved in 
pursuing litigation.161  
Seven other states – California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Kansas, Maryland, and 
Vermont – also impose civil penalties for willful violations. Criminal violations are included 
in the statutes of nine other states: Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Vermont.162  
California’s Labor Code §2753 makes individuals, other than attorneys, liable for advising 
employers to classify workers as independent contractors to avoid employee status:  
A person who, for money or other valuable consideration, knowingly advises an 
employer to treat an individual as an independent contractor to avoid employee 
status for that individual shall be jointly and severally liable with the employer if the 
individual is found not to be an independent contractor.163
Businesses that intentionally misclassify workers might assume the risk and costs 
associated with liability for violations. These states have statutes that authorize stop 
work orders as an additional deterrent: Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Connecticut, Vermont, 
Delaware, and Maine.164  The Connecticut statute, for example, authorizes the state’s 
Labor Commissioner to issue stop work orders within 72 hours of a determination that an 
employer is defrauding the Workers’ Compensation fund.165  
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POLICY RECOMMENDATION
Provide on-demand workers with statutory rights and protections in the 
following areas: 
 ►  unemployment insurance
 ►  workers compensation coverage
 ►  wage and hour protection 
 ►  family and medical leave
 ►  workplace health and safety
 ►  withholding of taxes
 ►  pension security
 ►  anti-discrimination
 ►  right to organize and collectively bargain
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APPendIX A: the new york stAte APP workers survey
The material presented above in the section on “NYS On-Demand Experiences” draws from several 
sources. Worker Institute researchers compiled comments found on the job website Indeed.com for 
online platform workers from New York state between August and November 2018. We created a 
short survey which we distributed by email, using several different email lists. The largest of these 
was the email list of the NY State AFL-CIO; some affiliates distributed the survey further; the Tompkins 
County Workers’ Center sent the survey to its email list as well. Over the course of six weeks, we 
received 220 responses to the survey, of which 163 provided information about work obtained 
through platforms. We also conducted twelve semi-structured interviews with self-identified survey 
respondents.
Below are descriptive statistics on the survey respondents.
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Table A-2: Full/Part Time Status by Gender 
(n= 148) 
Gender Full time Side job 
Male 39% 61% 
Female 20% 80% 
Other 75% 25% 
Total 34% 66% 
 
Table A-1: Ability to cover living expenses with app work, by Platform 
(Selected Platforms, n=156) 
  
Fully by 
myself 
With income 
from 
partner/spouse 
/family 
Has another 
job 
Resorts to 
other income/ 
support 
sources 
Other Total 
Uber 16% 17% 36% 18% 12% 100% 
Lyft 13% 15% 39% 20% 13% 100% 
Doordash 0% 0% 50% 43% 7% 100% 
InstaCart 13% 13% 40% 27% 7% 100% 
Postmates 0% 0% 50% 38% 13% 100% 
UberEats 12% 21% 33% 27% 6% 100% 
Airbnb 17% 0% 25% 17% 42% 100% 
 
Table A-3: Ability to cover living expenses by Full/Part Time Status (n=157) 
Q: Are you able to cover your living expenses with app work? 
Full Time Part Time 
Yes, fully by myself 25% 5% 
Yes, with income from partner/spouse or family 30% 4% 
No, I have another job 4% 62% 
No, I have to resort to other sources of income/resources 30% 20% 
Other 11% 10% 
Total 100% 100% 
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Table A-4: Full/Part Time Status by NYS Region 
(n=149) 
NYS Region Full time Side Job 
Capital Region (e.g. Albany, Schenectady, Troy) 32% 68% 
Central New York (e.g. Syracuse) 50% 50% 
New York City 57% 43% 
Long Island 17% 83% 
Western New York (e.g. Buffalo, Jamestown) 23% 77% 
Finger Lakes Region (e.g. Rochester, Ithaca) 21% 79% 
Lower Hudson (Westchester & Rockland) 0% 100% 
Mid-Hudson (e.g. Poughkeepsie, Kingston, Newburgh) 22% 78% 
Mohawk Valley (e.g. Utica, Rome) 33% 67% 
North Country (e.g. Watertown, Plattsburgh) 0% 100% 
Southern Tier (e.g. Binghamton, Elmira) 17% 83% 
Total 34% 66% 
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APPENDIX B:   
ON-DEMAND PLATFORM COMPANIES BY REVENUE
 
Airbnb, Inc. Lodging marketplace San Francisco, CA 2008 $2.6 billion (2017) Privately-held 
The "hosts" list their properties and "travelers" book 
through the marketplace. 
Care.com Care services Waltham, MA  $174.1 million (2017) Publicly-traded 
Provides an online marketplace that connects customers 
with caregivers (child, elder, and pet care, 
housekeepers, cleaners and tutors) 
Caviar, Inc. Food delivery San Francisco, CA 2014 $1.23 million (2017) Subsidiary: Square, Inc. Food delivery 
DoorDash, Inc. Food delivery San Francisco, CA 2013  Privately-held "Dashers" deliver food and other items to clients. 
Fiverr Freelance marketplace Tel Aviv, Israel 2010 $4.4 million (2017) Privately-held On-line marketplace for digital services. 
Freelancer 
Limited 
Freelance 
marketplace Sydney, Australia 2009 $26.3 million (2017) Publicly-traded 
A global marketplace to allow employers to access 
freelance provider.  Employers post a job and 
freelancers bid for it. 
Gett, Inc. Transportation New York City 2011 $2.7 million (2017) Privately-held On-demand transportation and delivery company. Available in the US via Juno. 
Grubhub, Inc. Food delivery Chicago, IL 2004 $683 million (2017) Publicly-traded Food delivery and take-out 
Handy Home services New York City 2012 $6 million (2017) Privately-held On-line marketplace for residential cleaning, installation and other services. 
Instacart Goods delivery San Francisco, CA 2012  Privately-held Same day grocery delivery 
Juno Transportation New York City 2016  Subsidiary: Gett, Inc. On-demand ride-sharing company. 
Lyft Transportation San Francisco, CA 2012 $1 billion (2017) Privately-held On-demand ride sharing company. 
Postmates Goods delivery San Francisco, CA 2011 $21 million (2017) Privately-held Food, drinks and groceries delivery 
Rover.com Care services Seattle, WA 2011  Privately-held On-line marketplace for pet sitters and dog walkers 
Shipt Goods delivery Alabama, San Francisco 2014 19.8 million (2017) Subsidiary: Target Grocery and alcohol delivery. 
Sittercity Care services Chicago, IL 2001  Privately-held Connects parents and caregivers 
Sittingaround Care services     Connects parents with childcare cooperatives. 
Takl Home services Nashville, TN 2015 $466,403 (2017) Privately-held On-line platform that connects clients with skilled providers. 
TaskRabbit Home services San Francisco, CA 2008 $5.4 million (2017) Ikea subsidiary On-line marketplace to match clients with freelance labor. 
Thumbtack Freelance marketplace San Francisco, CA 2008 $2.49 million (2017) Privately-held 
Online service that matches customers with local 
professionals. 
Uber 
Technologies, 
Inc. 
Transportation San Francisco, CA 2009 $37 billion (2017) Privately-held 
Uber described its services as a "peer-to-peer 
ridesharing, taxi cab, food delivery, bicycle-sharing, 
and transportation network. 
Upwork Freelance marketplace Mountain View, CA 2015 $2.52 million (2017) Publicly-traded "Hirers" sign up, post projects and request quotes. 
Urbansitter, Inc. Care services San Francisco, CA 2011 $1.82 million (2017) Privately-held The platform connects parents with a network of childcare providers. 
Via 
Transportation Transportation New York City, NY 2012 $11 million (2017) Privately-held On-demand ride-sharing company. 
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